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Rights of Ex-Patients in the Community: 
The Next Frontier?t 
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, E S Q .* 
Perhaps the most significant comment which can be made about the topic 
of "rights in the community" is simply, that it is a topic. Although the 
"right to treatment" concept is less than two decades old, 1 questions as to 
the adequacy of treatment date back, at the least, to the Middle Ages: 2 
"right to refuse treatment" theories3 might appear new or "radical" to 
some;4 however, the origins of the concept date back to Blackstone. 5 Of 
course, insanity defense questions have plagued the judicial system since 
Lord Bracton wrote in the 1200's.6 
Yet, the seemingly relatively-innocuous topic of "rights of the mentally 
handicapped7 in the community" was not even conceptualized as a topic 
for cocktail party conversation until the past several years;8 although its 
recent growth has hardly been meteoric,lJ and in spite of general 
backsliding by the United States Supreme Court in the general area of 
"rights to services in the community," 10 it has become an area of 
significance to all practicing mental health attorneys and to mental health 
professionals as well. Hopefully, it will be one of those areas in which 
there is general agreement between the two, and, much more importantly, 
it is likely that it is the one area in which further rights development will 
realistically be one giant step on the rocky and often Sisyphus-like road 
towards "normalization" of former patients, as well as a first step 
towards the meaningful eradication of the stigma of the label of 
"psychiatric patient." 
In many ways, of course, the whole bundle of community rights could 
not have even come into theoretical existence had not the right to 
treatment and least restrictive alternative litigation developed as they 
had. Those cases - which firmly entrenched the concepts of both 
procedural! I and substantive!2 due process in the legal fabric of mental 
health law - were the first legal recognition of the overwhelming and 
virtually irreversible burden which saddled persons labeled deviant by the 
mental health and judicial systems. Cases such as Lessard v. Schmidt, 13 
Wyatt v. Stickney '4 and O'Connor v. Donaldson IS - when read together 
- established basic legal principles which would serve as the important 
groundwork for future legal developments: there is a constitutional right 
to liberty'h (the "natural state of individuals"):'- before one can be 
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deprived of that right, the process of deprivation must comport with strict 
due process procedures 18 to minimize the risk of error l9 (and to place such 
risk on the committing agency, not the person at risk)20 so that 
institutionalization is seen as the last resort; 21 if a person is to be 
institutionalized, that institutionalization cannot meet constitutional 
muster if it does not offer a person a reasonable opportunity to receive 
such care and treatment in a humane environment as to enhance that 
person's likelihood of being released; 22 while institutionalized, similar 
due process concepts should mandate that a person is not stripped of his 
other civil rights simply because he is a mental patient;23 in fact, it is 
impermissible to presume a person incompetent to manage his affairs 
because of his status as a patient. 24 
It is equally important to note that decisions such as Wyatt and 
Lessard cannot be viewed - even by the most resistant to change - as 
aberrant or idiosyncratic. Virtually every post- Wyatt treatment case has 
cited it with approval;25 indeed, Wyatt is seen as the progenitor of 
virtually all of the "Patients' Bills of Rights"26 which have been enacted 
in the past six years, and which the prestigious President's Commission 
on Mental Health has urged all states to adopt as well,27 Similarly, 
virtually every challenge to commitment procedures based on the Lessard 
theory has been successful;28 in the rare instances where challenges to 
legislation have been turned back, invariably there has been a revision of 
court civil practice rules to comply with Lessard-level mandates. 29 
Indeed, in turning down Florida's claim in O'Connor that treatment 
issues were not justiciable by courts, the United States Supreme Court 
specifically rejected such a notion, pointing out it was "plainly 
unacceptable" to suggest that courts are powerless to determine 
"adequacy of treatment. "30 
As discussed above, of course, this development of mental health rights 
law must be seen as a logical culmination of the expansion of such parallel 
fields as civil rights, consumer rights, criminal procedure and inmates' 
rights: 30A to a large extent, mental health law is at the crossroads of all of 
those paths, as an outgrowth of a process by which lawyers have become 
able to contribute to "public consciousness of inequities or shortcomings 
in the society"30B through" substantive concerns with issues of social 
policy." 30e 
The logical progression from Brown v. Board of Education 30D to 
Gideon v. Wainwright30E to O'Connor v. Donaidson 30F should thus be 
clear. Patients and former patients are merely replicating the experiences 
of thousands of other American citizens who have, in recent years, begun 
to seek relief through the courts as a means of redressing civil 
grievances. 30G Again, it must be underscored that this new court 
involvement must be considered in relation to those traditionally 
institutionalized in large, public psychiatric hospitals (and thus, those to 
be released from such facilities) - the poor, the minorities, the voiceless, 
those persons traditionally isolated from the mainstream of the 
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majoritarian, democratic political system. 30H 
This backdrop is significant, of course, for reasons far beyond the 
specific issues resolved in the cases in question. It is of incalculable 
symbolic value in any attempt to predict how courts will respond to 
similar challenges raised on behalf of patients (and former patients) to 
practices in the community which deprive them of their civil rights. 
Again, this shift in focus was underlined by the Task Force Panel on 
Legal and Ethical Issues in its report to the President's Commission on 
Mental Health: 
[T]he panel anticipates that as our country moves increasingly from 
institutional to community based care, it will be important for 
advocacy efforts to shift from exposing abuses and deficiencies in 
institutions to protecting mentally handicapped persons from a wide 
range of deprivations to basic civil rights and privileges that they too 
often experience in the community. 31 
Although the report is probably unduly optimistic in two of its 
assumptions - that abuse and deficiencies in institutions will be reduced 
commensurately with reduced institutional populations, and that advocates 
will be able to" shift" their efforts from one population to the other - it is 
important, nonetheless, as a first serious recognition on the Federal level 
that "rights in the community" will continue to grow in importance in 
both the immediate and long-term future. 
In examining "rights in the community," then, it appears that there are 
at least two bundles of issues involved which must be looked at through 
slightly different filters: issues which arise directly involving an 
individual's status as ex-patient (or as one still receiving psychiatric 
services), and those which arise as a corollary to such a status. Although 
the legal thories propounded in both types of cases may have similar 
bases, and although constitutional due process and equal protection 
considerations may apply in all matters, it is clear that, socially and 
politically, different variables may be present in the two types of cases. 
At the outset, it should be noted that a group of cases has arisen under 
the general (if somewhat imprecise and overbroad) rubric of "right to 
aftercare." These cases have, by and large, emanated from the right to 
treatment litigation, and have focused on the need to extend treatment 
rights theories to community settings. The first, and most significant, 
arose in Washington, D.C., in the context of the hardly-atypical world of 
S1. Elizabeth's Hospital: hundreds of patients, including many elderly 
persons, were being improvidently held at the facility because, in the pat 
phrase of both the institutional and the community social service 
providers: "There's nowhere else for them to gO."3IA In that case, Dixon 
v. Weinberger,32 the Federal District Court found that, under D. C. law, 
the plaintiffs had a statutory right to aftercare, and that that right had been 
violated as a result of the D. C. Government's failure to provide suitable 
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alternative facilities for those St. Elizabeth's Hospital patients who no 
longer met statutory criteria for hospitalization. 33 The court ruled that 
there was a specific affirmative obligation on the part of District officials 
to place those patients" determined suitable for placement in alternative 
facilities in proper facilities that are less restrictive alternatives to the 
hospital ... such alternatives including but not being limited to nursing 
homes, foster homes, personal care home's and halfway houses."33A 
Although Dixon was originally viewed as, perhaps, another breakthrough 
on the level of a Wyatt or a Lessard, it has not yet lived up to that 
reputation. In the first instance, bluntly, many of the ordered transfers 
simply never took place: although the hospital agreed during the trial that 
about 43% of the patients were ready for community living, and although 
clinical staff even identified nearly 1300 candidates for deinstitutional-
ization (out of a population of 2700), hospital officials soon backtracked, 
claiming that only 402 of those patients were truly appropriate candidates 
for placement. Although many of the original targets for deinstitu-
tionalization remain in the hospital, they have been reclassified as 
'" unacceptable for community living because of inappropriate, although 
not dangerous, social behavior such as wandering, disrobing, throwing 
temper tantrums, and verbally abusing others."34 Again, the special 
HE W assistant secretary in charge of improving mental health services at 
St. Elizabeth's has repeated, "Where are we going to put all these 
people?"35 
This inaction, it should be noted, has not gone uncommented upon. 
Inadequacy of compliance by Federal officials was the basis for a specific 
recommendation by the President's Commission's Task Force discussed 
above, that" HE W promptly take all actions necessary to implement the 
Dixon ruling and to extend its application to all relevant Federal 
programs. "35A As of the writing of this paper, of course, this 
recommendation has not been implemented. Not surprisingly, attorneys 
for the Dixon patients are back in court on the question of the 
acceptability of the implementation plan finally drawn by D.C. and 
federal officials. One example of the conflict: HEW wants to convert 
vacant buildings of the old D.C. Children's Hospital into a "multiservice 
facility" for released patients; such a facility, its officials assert, "would 
not be an institution ... but a protected environment to help its residents 
adjust to life in the community."36 Again, not surprisingly, the patients' 
lawyers oppose the idea: "To concentrate former mental patients in large 
vacant structures of a kind and size not commonly used by other members 
of the community and to isolate them from normal contacts that they 
would otherwise have, may well obstruct their reintegration into the 
community. "37 The books, then, are hardly closed on the Dixon case. 38 
Another case brought on the same general basis as Dixon was settled 
successfully in 1978 in Maine, when officials of that state signed a 
settlement decree in Federal Court affirming the right of released 
mentally handicapped persons to receive, in the community, "habilitation, 
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including medical treatment, education, training and care, suited to their 
needs, regardless of age, degree of retardation or handicapped condition. "39 
Although attorneys for plaintiffs in the case hailed the decision as "the 
next important step"40 beyond the traditional right-to-treatment decisions, 
the ink is still barely dry on the decree, so it cannot yet be determined 
what empirical substantive effect it will have on whether state officials 
simply will, in fact, do what they have promised to do in court. 40A Similar 
litigation has been concluded in Massachusetts,40B but again, it is still not 
yet clear if the state is complying. 
Although it is not specifically articulated in either the District of 
Columbia or Maine cases, it appears that the decisions were premised, to 
some extent at least, on the legal theory which suggests that in situations 
where further inpatient confinement is "predictably anti therapeutic, 
further confinement must be deemed to effect a continuing violation of 
due process."4J That theory is the underpinning of the arguments 
forwarded by plaintiffs and amicus in a similar New Jersey case on the 
right to aftercare42 which has been awaiting trial for over three years; 
however, as of this date, there is still no indication of a trial date being set. 42A 
Probably the most significant decision in this line, however, will prove 
to be an action brought on behalf of residents of a large Pennsylvania 
institution in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital. 43 
where a Federal District Court held that the equal protection clause of 
the United States Constitution "prohibit[ ed] the segregation of the 
retarded44 in an isolated institution such as Pennhurst where habilitation 
does not measure up to minimally adequate standards,"45 and ordered 
that" immediate steps be taken to [thus] remove the retarded residents 
from Pennhurst,"46 commensurate with the exercise of ., great caution 
and care ... to make certain that each and every retarded resident who 
is removed from Pennhurst can be accommodated in a community 
facility which will provide minimally adequate habilitation. "47 Again, 
although plaintiffs' attorney's prediction that the Halderman case will 
"spell the end of more than a century of incarceration for the retarded in 
the United States"48 is highly speculative, it is clear that the opinion is a 
drastically new and unprecedented approach - based upon a "right to 
non-discriminatory habilitation"49 (a theory arrived at by analogizing 
from such landmark civil rights cases as Brown v. Board of Education SO 
which outlawed racial segregation in public school systems) - which will 
undoubtedly spawn similar, imitative suits in other jurisdictions. When 
this happens, it is likely that - at least on a symbolic and theoretical level 
- the decision will have the same impact on deinstitutionalization issues 
that Wyatt5 J had on matters involving treatment: it will .. repaint the 
landscape for all time. "52 
Aftercare cases, of course, are not the only area of community rights 
directly involving the ex-patient's status as a former patient, especially if 
he/she is still receiving psychiatric services at, e.g .• a community mental 
health center. There has been little litigation yet brought on behalf of such 
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patients; this probably due to a combination of factors, including lack of 
access to counsel (those few governmentally-funded programs that exist 
concentrating primarily on representation of institutionalized patients or 
persons threatened by a loss of liberty)53 and to a traditional (still 
common) feeling that, with spaces at such community facilities at such a 
premium, once a patient was discharged from a hospital to a community 
center, helshe would not want to "rock the boat" and imperil hislher 
preferred status as outpatient. 54 It is inevitable, though, that with each 
year, more actions will be brought to vindicate rights directly related to 
one's status as a participant in such facilities. 
The few cases actually litigated have concentrated on issues involving 
the records of a patient's stay at an institution: the degree of 
confidentiality required, and the applicability of expungement statutes to 
such records. In a consent decree in one Pennsylvania case, a federal 
court ruled that city outpatient clinics must adopt stringent rules "with 
respect to maintaining the confidentiality of the medical records of all 
persons who have undergone or are presently undergoing treatment"55 at 
such centers; in another case in that state's local courts, it was ordered 
that a former patient was entitled to copies of" all medical records" which 
were amassed during his hospitalization at a private inpatient psychiatric 
clinic. 56 Similarly, in those states which have enacted expungement laws, 
the court trend is generally towards a liberal interpretation of such criteria 
as "cured" or "restored to reason "56A so as to expand the potential class 
of ex-patients who might avail themselves of the prophylactic effects of 
the statutes; in fact, some legislatures are now amending such laws to 
include patients" in substantial remission" as part of the class that can 
seek such expungement. 56B 
The tabula, however, is particularly rasa in the knottier area of 
treatment rights: do community-based patients, e.g., have the right to 
"minimally adequate treatment"57 in such facilities? Do they have the 
right to refuse treatment?58 If they do receive treatment, can the facility 
exert the sanction of expulsion (or, in the increasingly common fact 
pattern through which a person is diverted to a Community Mental Health 
Center as a probationary term in lieu of jail for a petty offense or 
misdemeanor, if hel she refuses treatment, can hel she be sent to jail on the 
theory that hel she has violated a term of probation)? Are community 
facilities governed by state enacted "Patients' Bills of Rights" which 
establish rights to due process hearings prior to the involuntary 
imposition of electroshock? Can First Amendment rights of freedom of 
speech and expression be abrogated by such centers? If a therapist feels it 
is detrimental to the patient's best interest, can. hel she contact the local 
welfare or unemployment office and suggest the patient be denied 
benefits? Although these questions are all couched hypothetically, it is 
clear that all of these circumstances have arisen in the recent past. It is 
not a particularly radical prediction to suggest that many of them will be 
the subject of litigation in the ensuing years. 
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These issues to the side, however, there remains the entire bundle of 
rights in the community which arises in contexts corollary to the subject's 
status as ex-patient. Although there is, at this point in time, at least, "no 
presently recognized right to services"59 for any American citizens in the 
community, case after case has been brought vindicating the civil rights 
and basic rights of citizenship of individual mentally handicapped persons 
(and classes of such persons). In this context, the mental health lawyer 
takes the view that the central issue is one of "welfare entitlements" and 
that, based on the theory of recent United States Supreme Court 
developments in this area,60 what used to be characterized as 
"governmental largesse" should be considered a right rather than a 
privilege: within this framework, the lawyer's role is to maximize the 
gains of otherwise-qualified persons in demanding their right to such 
entitlements.6oA Importantly, there is usually a high degree of consensus 
between mental health advocates and service providers on the need for 
vindication of such rights and on the importance of such rights to 
formerly- hospitalized persons. 60B 
Thus, courts have outlawed status discrimination against former 
patients in such areas as voting rights,6l drivers' license suspensions,62 
zoning,63 employment,64 and welfare65 and SSI benefits.66 It is true that these 
decisions have been generally idiosyncratic and reactive; however, they 
are most likely an important first step on a legal path which will 
eventually see litigation on behalf of former patients in all areas of 
community living, including such uncharted areas as professional 
licensure, admission to institutions of higher education, and availability of 
adequate housing.66A New approaches to litigation will also be necessary 
in such areas as discrimination by nursing homes against former 
patients66B and extension of the concept of" fair share" housing plans to 
the mentally handicapped: 66c creativity must be the byword. 
In addition to litigation, former patients and their advocates have been 
turning to legislatures to enact bills similarly banning such status 
discrimination. Many "Patients' Bills of Rights" now include blanket 
antidiscrimination language. 66D Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
197367 further appears to open new doors in the areas of recreation, 
employment, education and social services (although the issue of whether 
that section implies a so-called ., private cause of action"68 is still not 
settled). The President's Commission's Task Force recommendation that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be amended to include persons with mentally 
handicapping conditions as a protected c1ass69 has stlil not been acted 
upon by Congress; yet individual states are just beginning to amend their 
counterpart state antidiscrimination laws to include the mentally 
handicapped and/or the former patient. 70 Again, it is still not clear what 
ultimate effect these statutory changes will have on the way such persons 
are treated in the community. 
Finally, of course, it is acknowledged by all concerned that litigation, 
legislation, executive orders and court rules will have little empirical 
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effect if nothing is done to attempt to reverse the pattern of social and 
cultural stigma as a result of which discrimination persists and" a large 
portion of the public 'continues to be frightened and repelled by the notion 
of mental illness,' "70A a stigma specifically acknowledged recently by the 
United States Supreme Court in the Addington (burden of proof) 
case.70AA The President's Commission aptly noted that this stereotypic 
stigmatization was a major stumbling block in the path of meaningful 
community treatment, 70B noting, again accurately, that "people with 
chronic mental disabilities are the most rejected and stigmatized of all, 
particularly because disproportionate numbers of them are also elderly, 
poor or members of racial or ethnic minorities."70c As the focus on legal 
issues shifts in some significant part to the community, these issues cry 
out for greater clarification and understanding. 
What is clear, however, is this: the litigation and legislation discussed 
above have helped create a climate in which the question of "rights in the 
community" can no longer be seen as a merely intellectual abstraction or 
topic for law review commentary; that new climate should help rid society 
of the heretofore prevalent atmosphere in which, in the words of former 
Assistant United States Attorney General, Patricia Wald, the handi-
capped person has been perceived as "someone to whom attention need 
not be paid,'>?l and should replace it with a new sense that each person, 
whether or not a former patient, is ensured that" equal access to justice 
r which} is the cornerstone of the American judicial system. "72 
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Editor's Note: Since this paper was originally prepared, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals substantially affirmed the District Court's 
decision in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital. 612 F. 
2d 84 (3 Cir. 1979). Whereas the lower court had held that the equal 
protection clause supported a right to non-discriminatory habilitation 
"prohibit[ ing] the segregation of the retarded in an isolated institution 
such as Pennhurst where habilitation does not measure up to minimally 
adequate standards," the Circuit eschewed the Constitution and based its 
holding instead on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act, ruling that, as part of the law's guarantee of treatment in the 
least restrictive environment, "the clear preference of the Act. . . is 
deinstitutionalization," and that institutionalization of the retarded would 
be appropriate only in those "probably comparatively rare [cases where J 
adequate habilitation could not be accomplished in any setting less 
restrictive than an institution." 
The Circuit's only major modification of the District Court's decision 
reversed that portion of the lower court's order which ruled that 
Pennhurst must be entirely closed, reasoning that, as "there may be some 
individual patients who because of advanced age, profound degree of 
retardation, special needs or for some other reason, will not be able to 
adjust to life outside of an institution and thus will be harmed by such a 
change," and ordered a remand for "individual determinations as to the 
appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for each patient," noting that, 
on remand, the court "should engage a presumption in favor of placing 
individuals in [community facilities J. It simultaneously warned that, if the 
facility is to remain open, "it must be dramatically improved so as to 
provide adequate habilitation," and cautioned that, before transfers could 
be made to community facilities, there must be "assurances that the 
sanitary, staffings and program deficiencies which were found at 
Pennhurst [will not be] duplicated on a smaller scale in [the community 
facilities] ... where changes in the size of buildings and their location are 
not enough to meet the statutory requirements." 
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari. 
and has stayed only that portion of the order which would have allowed 
transfers of Pennhurst patients to the community over the objections of 
the residents' parents. Oral argument is scheduled for the 1980-1981 
United States Supreme Court term. 
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